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Abstract 
In the mid-1990s, the largest state-owned banks in the Kyrgyz Republic faced insolvency and 
a concomitant large stock of nonperforming loans, a problem stemming from the former 
Soviet Union’s policy of directed credit to loss-making institutions. The government 
established DEBRA, a debt resolution agency and asset management company. DEBRA could 
liquidate or restructure a bank and take on its assets in the process, or just take on a bank’s 
nonperforming assets. DEBRA received the assets in exchange for government securities. 
Staff attempted to resolve the debt by collection, restructuring, writing off, or liquidating the 
assets. Officials initially established DEBRA with a three-year mandate, but the entity 
eventually evolved into a semipermanent fixture in the country’s financial system that still 
operated as of April 2021. By April 1999, the end of its initial mandate, DEBRA’s portfolio of 
bad loans totaled Som 1,573 million (USD $42 million), 73% of which were unresolved.  
Keywords: Kyrgyz Republic, asset management companies, asset purchase programs, 
DEBRA, nonperforming loans, nonperforming assets  
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At a Glance  
Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, the Kyrgyz Republic’s financial 
system was structured to act as a regional 
component of the greater state system, 
which allocated resources according to the 
central government’s expectations. Kyrgyz 
financial institutions lent to enterprises 
when directed to do so by Soviet officials 
and often did so without objective 
considerations of creditworthiness: the 
loans mostly covered losses or helped 
maintain employment. The Kyrgyz 
Republic government continued this 
practice until early 1994 (World Bank 
1996). 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the Kyrgyz Republic experienced 
severe economic hardship caused by the 
cessation of former Soviet budget backing, 
previously amounting to approximately 
10% of the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP), and trade. These 
repercussions continued to weigh on the 
Kyrgyz Republic in 1996. That year, the 
Kyrgyz Republic’s financial system 
consisted of the country’s central bank, 
then called the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan 
(NBK), 17 commercial banks, and a savings 
bank. Four of the banks, the so-called “Big 
Four” that were state-owned specialized 
banks, accounted for 80% of the system’s 
assets (World Bank 1996). The 18 
institutions’ assets totaled 16.5% of the 
country’s GDP in 1995, and only 8% of the 
system’s gross loan portfolio was 
considered performing.4 Government-directed lending, as well as a culture of poor lending 
practices, led to the large stock of nonperforming loans. Additionally, the government offered 
the Big Four “implicit subsidies, including the free lease of many local premises and the 
 
3 Documents detailing DEBRA programming did not include a US dollar equivalent for this figure. The author 
calculated the US dollar equivalent using the National Bank of Kazakhstan’s historical exchange rate data 
available at https://www.nbkr.kg/index1.jsp?item=2857&lang=ENG. 
 
4 The World Bank’s 16.5% figure differs slightly from the Bloomberg data, 11.84%, shown in the Kyrgyz 
Republic context table below. A variety of technical explanations for this difference exist, such as subsequent 
data revisions related to definitional changes. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “acquire, collect or write-off the old non-
performing loans” from the liquidation or 
restructuring of the “dominant and insolvent state 
banks” (World Bank 2000) 
Launch Dates Formed: May 1996 
 
Operational: October 1996 
Wind-Down Dates Initially three-year 
timeframe but extended; 
DEBRA’s operations have 
not ceased as of April 2021 
Size and Type of 
Nonperforming 
Loan Problem 
92% of the financial 
system’s loan portfolio was 
nonperforming in 1995  
 
Primarily commercial loans 
Program Size Not specified at outset 
Eligible Institutions National Bank of 
Kyrgyzstan–approved 
banks; four state-owned 
banks initially targeted 
 
Open and closed-bank 
Usage  Som 1,573 million (USD 
$42 million) as of 19993 
Outcomes Approx. 73% left to be 
resolved as of April 1999 
Ownership Structure Government-Owned 
Notable Features DEBRA continues to operate 
nearly 25 years after 
establishment 
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rescheduling of some NBK refinancing on soft terms” (World Bank 1996). Finally, poor 
lending practices in the immediate lead-up to the country’s later financial system reforms 
occurred as the banks’ shareholders and managers showed “little concern about further 
losses” because the institutions were already insolvent and “waiting for some form of a bail-
out” from the government (World Bank 1996). 
To stabilize the financial system, and by extension, help the broader economy, the Kyrgyz 
Republic undertook broad restructuring efforts, including updating the country’s regulatory 
environment and dealing with the large insolvent state banks and their nonperforming loans. 
The latter part of the strategy began in earnest when the NBK board in 1996 created DEBRA, 
a debt restructuring agency and asset management company (AMC), to take control and 
dispose of assets and liabilities of banks the NBK sought to liquidate or restructure. The 
World Bank supported the government’s efforts via a Financial Sector Adjustment Credit 
(FINSAC), a loan that helped fund DEBRA’s operations and other financial system changes. 
The multilateral institution also facilitated the creation of the FINSAC Review Committee, 
which oversaw the implementation of reforms (World Bank 1996). 
DEBRA could liquidate or restructure a bank and take on its assets in the process, or just take 
on a bank’s nonperforming assets (World Bank 1996). Any institution or assets the NBK 
approved could be transferred to DEBRA, but officials initially and explicitly targeted the Big 
Four, liquidating two and restructuring two (World Bank 1996). During DEBRA’s original 
three-year mandate, it also received nonperforming loans from eight other commercial 
banks and was appointed liquidator of an additional large bank (World Bank 2000). It is 
unclear if the eight commercial banks were restructured or liquidated. 
DEBRA comprised two main units: the Bank Restructuring Unit (BRU), which performed the 
receiver and restructuring functions, and the Debt Recovery Unit (DRU), which dealt with 
the nonperforming loan portfolios transferred from the banks. Policymakers chose to 
transfer bad assets to the DRU “to avoid moral hazard and the loss of financial discipline that 
would result from wholesale, unconditional forgiveness of non-performing loans to the 
enterprise sector” (World Bank 1996).  
The DRU recovered, sold, or wrote off the nonperforming assets it received. DRU staff had a 
variety of recovery and resolution methods at its disposal, including discounts, debt 
collateral swaps, debt restructuring, and the auction or sale of the debt (World Bank 1996). 
The agency originally planned to create automatic criteria for determining how to handle 
certain categories of loans but ended up creating individual plans for each debtor (World 
Bank 2000). The received assets were initially required to be resolved by the termination of 
DEBRA’s original three-year mandate (World Bank 1996). Policymakers later extended the 
AMC’s mandate by three additional years, to May 2002, to handle the liquidation of another 
large bank (World Bank 2000). Over subsequent years, DEBRA became a semipermanent, 
increasingly independent fixture in the Kyrgyz financial system, liquidating and 
rehabilitating banks and collecting debts on behalf of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (World 
Bank 2015). DEBRA still operated as of April 2021. 
During the three years of its initial mandate, DEBRA took on a total portfolio of Som 1,573 
million (USD $42 million), 73% of which was still unresolved as of April 1999 (World Bank 
2000). DEBRA officials ascribed the poor resolution outcomes to problems with court-
appointed executors and the particularly bad quality of the assets it handled (World Bank 
2000). In addition to poor resolution results, the country’s stock of nonperforming loans rose 
after DEBRA’s intervention. Loans classified as “less than satisfactory” increased to 34% in 
1999 from 9% in 1997 (World Bank 2000). It remains unclear if the nonperforming loans 
DEBRA originally received in the 1990s remain on the AMC’s books today, but many of its 
liquidation cases had “been lingering for more than a decade,” as of 2015 (World Bank 2015). 
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Weak bank risk management, along with DEBRA’s internal management structures and the 
1998 Russian financial crisis, contributed to the AMC’s poor resolution outcomes and the 
subsequent rise in bad assets in the Kyrgyz financial system, according to assessments by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank analysts. DEBRA’s “technical and 
operational capacity,” as well as its funding and legal status, impacted its ability to resolve 
the bad debt (IMF 2003). The AMC’s eventual housing under the MOF hindered DEBRA’s 
ability to “define the appropriate form of management, procedures, and guidelines to carry 
out its” functions, IMF analysts found (IMF 2003). In June 2002, DEBRA was granted legal 
status as the sole liquidator of failed banks, but because DEBRA was under the umbrella of 
the MOF, this led the MOF to have status as both the creditor and liquidator of a failed bank. 
Moreover, MOF and NBK transfers funded DEBRA, along with general operation fees. IMF 
analysts suggested that financing operations solely through fees might resolve conflicts of 
interest (IMF 2003). 
Additionally, risk management in Kyrgyz Republic banks remained weak into the late 1990s, 
with “considerations other than risk management [guiding] the banks’ lending decisions” in 
some instances (World Bank 2000). 
Finally, Russia and its surrounding countries experienced a financial crisis in 1998, which 
contributed to the rise in bad assets in the Kyrgyz Republic (World Bank 2000). Some 
domestic banks “suffered some valuation losses from” the resultant depreciation of the som, 
“which had a significant impact on the quality of the banks’ loan portfolios denominated in 
foreign currency” (Implementation Completion Report 2000). Additionally, Kyrgyz Republic 
exporters with markets based in Russia struggled to service their loans because of reduced 
demand (World Bank 2000).  
The “Achilles heel of [the program] turned out to be the lack of adequate capacity and 
experience in banking supervision. Mostly this was a timing issue due to the fact that the 
financial crisis hit while [supervisory capacities were] being strengthened,” World Bank 
researchers noted in a 2000 report (World Bank 2000).  
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Kyrgyz Republic’s DEBRA: Kyrgyz Republic Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$1.66 billion in 1995 
$1.83 billion in 1996 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$364 in 1995 
$395 in 1996 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt) 
 
NA 
Size of banking system 
 
$0.20 billion in 1995 
$0.17 billion in 1996 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 11.84% in 1995 
9.41% in 1996 




Five-bank concentration of banking system 
 
NA 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
NA 
Government ownership of banking system 
 
NA 
Existence of deposit insurance No 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: Kyrgyz Republic officials created DEBRA to acquire assets when 
liquidating or restructuring and recapitalizing financial institutions, in addition 
to taking on specific loans or assets of a bank identified by the relevant 
authorities. 
Policymakers created the AMC DEBRA to liquidate two dominant and insolvent state-owned 
banks and to restructure two others, while taking on their nonperforming loans where 
necessary. These banks, the so-called “Big Four,” accounted for 80% of the banking system’s 
assets and were a priority for officials looking to stabilize the financial system (World Bank 
1996). Policymakers believed that the “strategy for these big banks [would] address the 
largest part of the bad asset problem in the banking sector” (World Bank 1996).  
Two of the four, Agroprom Bank and Elbank, had nonperforming-to-gross-loan ratios of 98% 
and were slated for liquidation. AKB Kyrgyzstan Bank, with an 85% ratio, and Promstroi 
Bank, which had a 60% ratio, were downsized and restructured through private and 
government recapitalization. “The survival of the Big Four banks [had] been possible only 
because of specially negotiated terms for the NBK debt and because of exemption from 
prudential regulations” (World Bank 1996). 
Lawmakers organized DEBRA into two main units to facilitate this strategy. Its Bank 
Restructuring Unit (BRU) performed a receivership function on behalf of the NBK, while its 
Debt Recovery Unit (DRU) managed and resolved the nonperforming loans transferred to it. 
The BRU assisted in the “intervention, receivership, conservatorship, deposit payout, and 
liquidation activities” of the banks and transferred nonperforming loans to the DRU (World 
Bank 1996). The DRU was set up to “act as the vehicle through which all recoveries [were] 
made by the Government” (World Bank 1996). 
DEBRA could also take over other financial institutions and their assets (World Bank 2000). 
2. Legal Authority: The NBK established DEBRA under the Resolution of the Board of 
NBKR No. 17/1. 
The resolution spelled out DEBRA’s restructuring, liquidating, and debt resolution functions 
in accordance with the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On bankruptcy (insolvency)” (World 
Bank 2000). The classification and restructuring processes for DEBRA were approved by the 
Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 412, dated August 28, 1996 (World 
Bank 2000). The FINSAC Review Committee, which approved the assets slated for transfer 
to DEBRA, was established on May 3, 1996, by a presidential decree (World Bank 1996). 
3. Special Powers: DEBRA could pursue restitution from bank leaders and 
shareholders that contributed to the bankruptcy of their financial institutions 
(IMF 2003). 
The extent to which DEBRA officials have utilized this special power is unclear. 
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4. Mandate: Policymakers created DEBRA to resolve assets acquired from nonviable 
banks slated for liquidation and viable banks that were to be restructured. 
Though the program initially targeted the Big Four, DEBRA could also take over other 
financial institutions and their assets, and it has done so. 
5. Ownership Structure: DEBRA was government-owned.  
DEBRA initially operated under the NBK (World Bank 2000). By 2003, the MOF owned 
DEBRA (IMF 2003). It had morphed into a “more independent entity reporting directly to 
the” country’s president by 2015 (World Bank 2015). 
6. Governance/Administration: DEBRA was headed by a director who reported 
directly to the chairman of the NBK, and the FINSAC Review Committee approved 
assets slated for transfer to the AMC. 
The director managed the day-to-day operations through two deputy directors. Though only 
the NBK chose which banks would be liquidated, and the NBK and MOF jointly determined 
assets to be transferred to DEBRA, the FINSAC Review Committee had to approve those 
transfers. The committee was also responsible for overseeing the implementation of 
government decisions stemming from the FINSAC program that the World Bank sponsored. 
The FINSAC Review Committee was chaired by the prime minister or his designee, while its 
membership was composed of DEBRA’s director; the chairmen of the NBK and the State 
Property Fund; and the ministers of finance, economy, agriculture, and justice (World Bank 
1996). 
DEBRA’s BRU comprised primarily NBK liquidation personnel. NBK and MOF employees 
staffed the DRU. The BRU received two foreign advisers “experienced in debt recovery 
methodologies, receivership procedures, and bank liquidations,” while the DRU received two 
foreign experts with experience in debt workouts and recovery (World Bank 1996).  
DEBRA was required to submit periodic reports to the NBK’s board and the Kyrgyz 
government and to cooperate with any mandatory audits (World Bank 1996). 
It is unclear how DEBRA’s governance and staffing structure changed as the organization’s 
mandate was extended and then exceeded. 
7. Size: Kyrgyz Republic officials do not appear to have established a size cap for 
DEBRA. 
World Bank documents detailing the program did not reference a size limit, and, in fact, 
granted that banks other than the Big Four could be liquidated and/or restructured and have 
their assets transferred to DEBRA (World Bank 1996). During the three years of its initial 
mandate, DEBRA took on debt worth Som 1,573 million (USD $42 million) (World Bank 
2000). 
8. Funding Sources: The Kyrgyz Republic government and the World Bank funded 
DEBRA’s asset acquisitions. 
World Bank analysts projected that resources needed for DEBRA’s first year of operation 
would total 300-350 million Soms (a maximum of USD $32 million) or about 1.5% of GDP. 
“Thereafter, the program would cost between 15–59 million Soms per annum, mainly as 
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interest on bonds to be issued as part of the bank restructuring program” (World Bank 
1996).  
The World Bank’s FINSAC loan, which totaled USD $45 million, was earmarked to pay for the 
first year’s costs and an additional USD $13 million in budget support during the rest of 
DEBRA’s initial mandate (World Bank 1996). The loan was disbursed in two tranches: the 
first in September 1996, and the second in November 1997 after the government met certain 
conditions of the agreement (World Bank 2000). Other costs of the banking system 
restructuring were financed by the national budget, “after first imposing losses on the banks’ 
shareholders” (World Bank 1996). These costs included “payments to depositors, the 
removal of bad assets from bank balance sheets,” and severance payments, among other 
outlays (World Bank 1996). 
Policymakers assumed at the outset that “collection and liquidation costs [would] be covered 
by the collections made against bad assets and the sale of assets under liquidation” (World 
Bank 1996). A follow-up report stated that DEBRA was eventually self-financing, funded by 
“an allocation of 5 percent of the debts it recovers” (World Bank 2000). 
By 2003, however, DEBRA operated off of a combination of fees and transfers from the MOF 
and NBK (IMF 2003). 
9. Eligible Institutions: Policymakers created DEBRA chiefly to liquidate and 
restructure the Big Four, but officials could choose to liquidate or restructure 
other banks as well with NBK approval. 
The NBK had the sole authority to choose banks other than the Big Four to liquidate, and the 
NBK and MOF jointly recommended assets to transfer to DEBRA. The FINSAC Review 
Committee was responsible for approving the asset transfers. Though the actual eligibility 
criteria for transferrable institutions is unclear within the available documentation, state-
owned banks were a “top priority” for the country’s restructuring strategy (World Bank 
1996). 
10. Eligible Assets: DEBRA took assets from restructured and liquidated banks and 
could also receive assets from financial institutions that DEBRA did not 
restructure or liquidate. 
The NBK and MOF jointly recommended assets to transfer to DEBRA, and the FINSAC Review 
Committee approved the asset transfers (World Bank 1996). It is unclear within available 
documentation how the assets were chosen. 
11. Acquisition (Mechanics): DEBRA received the banks’ nonperforming assets in 
exchange for government securities. 
The type of government security or securities used is unclear. The Kyrgyz Republic was in 
the process of developing its government securities market after DEBRA was created, 
preparing regulations in 2000 to issue government medium-term bonds with maturities 
from two to five years (World Bank 2000).  
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12. Acquisition (Pricing): It is unclear how DEBRA officials priced the assets the AMC 
received. 
Available program documents do not contain information about DEBRA’s pricing 
methodology. 
13. Recovery and Disposal: The DRU’s primary debt collection strategy was to utilize 
the most rapid and economical methods when trying to resolve bad assets. 
The BRU created “detailed” liquidation programs for Agroprom Bank and Elbank, which 
were both placed under the receivership of DEBRA to start the process (World Bank 2000). 
The strategy included selling or closing bank branches and paying off small depositors while 
transferring larger ones to a dedicated government entity. Diagnostic audits were prepared 
for Promstroi Bank and AKB Kyrgyzstan Bank, “and an internally managed program was 
implemented under a Management Letter Agreement with NBK, which provided for strong 
loan collection efforts, write offs and adequate loan-loss provisions, as well as downsizing 
and rationalization measures” (World Bank 2000). 
Documents detailing DEBRA’s original design suggested that the AMC would develop 
automatic criteria that would streamline debt recovery actions where possible (World Bank 
1996). However, DEBRA officials created individual action plans for each debtor, a strategy 
“that did not fully meet the initial understanding” of the World Bank, which helped fund the 
restructuring project (World Bank 2000). At any rate, DRU staff could use a variety of 
recovery methods, split into four categories detailed in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: DEBRA Recovery Methods 
Method Description 
Restructuring Placing the loan on a performing basis 
Forgiveness Partial forgiveness of either interest and/or loan principal and the 
restructuring of the remaining loan balance 
Liquidation Liquidating through collection efforts and/or sale of collateral; or selling 
through the sealed-bid process, auctions, or packaged sale mechanism to 
interested buyers or investors 
Write-Off Writing off all uncollectable principal and interest 
. 
Source: World Bank 1996. 
The government also introduced the leasing auction, which was then a new asset disposal 
method for the country. Details on how this methodology worked in practice, and whether 
or how often it was used, are unclear from available documentation. Additionally, in remote 
areas of the Kyrgyz Republic, “agricultural products were exchanged for debts” (World Bank 
2000).  
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14. Timeframe: Officials originally mandated that DEBRA operate for three years. The 
government then extended the mandate an additional three years before DEBRA 
later became a semipermanent fixture in the Kyrgyz Republic financial system. 
The NBK formed DEBRA in May 1996, and it became fully operational in October that year 
(World Bank 2000). DEBRA’s initial mandate was scheduled to terminate in Spring 1999. All 
DRU assets were “to be recovered, sold, or written off and the proceeds remitted to the 
central Government budget authorities by the termination date of DEBRA’s mandate” (World 
Bank 1996). Similarly, all receivership assets were “to be liquidated and the proceeds 
remitted to the proper authorities by the termination date of DEBRA's mandate” (World 
Bank 1996). 
Policymakers extended DEBRA’s mandate to May 2002 after the AMC was appointed 
liquidator of another bank (World Bank 2000). DEBRA was later granted the status of “sole 
liquidator of failed banks” in a revised bankruptcy law that was enacted in June 2002 (IMF 
2003). It “subsequently evolved into an asset management company with multiple tasks, and 
became a more independent entity reporting directly to the President,” with these changes 
formalized in August 2011 (World Bank 2015). Various attempts have been made to reform 
or close units of DEBRA in the past decade (World Bank 2015). For example, the country 
hired Deloitte to audit DEBRA with the goal of winding down DEBRA’s assets (Lavrova and 
Jenish 2015). 
Still, Kyrgyz Republic politicians adjusted DEBRA’s functions in 2017 and 2018. DEBRA 
operated and was in charge of liquidating three bankrupt banks as of April 2021. 
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